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Robots and automated processes have become a feature of many modern workplaces, but what
impact do such innovations have on productivity and jobs? Using a new dataset, Georg Graetz and
Guy Michaels present an analysis of the economic eﬀects of robots since the early 1990s, noting
that they have made a substantial contribution to productivity and aggregate growth. They also write
that while fears of robots destroying jobs on a large scale have proven unfounded, there is evidence
that they may reduce the employment of low and middle-skilled workers.
Robots’ capacity for autonomous movement and their ability to perform an expanding set of tasks
have captured writers’ imaginations for almost a century. Recently, robots have emerged from the
pages of science ﬁction novels into the real world, and discussions of their possible economic
eﬀects have become ubiquitous. But a serious problem inhibits these discussions: to date, there
has been no systematic empirical analysis of the economic eﬀects that robots are already having.
Our research begins to remedy this problem. We have compiled a new dataset spanning 14
industries (mainly manufacturing industries, but also agriculture and utilities) in 17 developed
countries (including Australia, European countries, South Korea and the United States). Uniquely, our dataset
includes a measure of the industrial robots employed in each industry in each of these countries, and how it has
changed between 1993 and 2007. We obtain information on workers’ hours and other economic indicators from the
EU KLEMS database.
We ﬁnd that industrial robots increase labour
productivity, total factor productivity and wages. At the
same time, while industrial robots have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on total hours worked (as we explain below),
there is some evidence that they reduce the
employment of low-skilled workers and, to a lesser
extent, middle-skilled workers.
What exactly are these industrial robots? Our data
come from the International Federation of Robotics,
which considers a machine as an industrial robot if it
can be programmed to perform physical, production
related tasks without the need of a human controller.
(The technical deﬁnition refers to a ‘manipulating
industrial robot as deﬁned by ISO 8373: An
automatically controlled, reprogrammable,
multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or
more axes, which may be either ﬁxed in place or
mobile for use in industrial automation applications’.)
Industrial robots dramatically increase the scope for replacing human labour compared with older types of
machines, since they reduce the need for human intervention in automated processes. Typical applications of
industrial robots include assembling, dispensing, handling, processing and welding – all of which are prevalent in
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manufacturing industries – as well as harvesting (in agriculture) and inspecting equipment and structures (common
in power plants).
Rapid technological change reduced the prices of industrial robots (adjusted for changes in quality) by around 80
per cent between 1993 and 2007. Unsurprisingly, the use of robots grew dramatically during this period: the ratio of
the number of robots to hours worked increased on average by about 150 per cent. The rise in robot use was
particularly pronounced in Germany, Denmark and Italy; and the industries that increased robot use most rapidly
were producers of transport equipment, chemicals and metals.
To estimate the impact of robots, we take advantage of variation across industries and countries and over time. A
consistent picture emerges in which robots appear to raise productivity, without causing total hours to decline. This
may seem surprising at ﬁrst, but it is due to oﬀsetting eﬀects. Robots increase productivity, which means that fewer
human hours are needed to produce a given output. But higher productivity also reduces production costs and
output prices. This in turn increases the quantity demanded by consumers, and ﬁrms hire workers to meet this
increased demand.
But could it be that higher productivity growth causes a larger increase in robot use, rather than the other way
around? To address this and related concerns, and to shed further light on the eﬀect of robots, we develop a novel
measure of increased robot use – namely, workers’ ‘replaceability’ by robots. This is based on the tasks prevalent in
industries before robots were widely employed.
Speciﬁcally, we match data on tasks performed by industrial robots today with data on similar tasks performed by
US workers in 1980, before robots were used. We then compute the fraction of each industry’s working hours in
1980 accounted for by occupations that subsequently became prone to replacement. Our industry-level
replaceability index strongly predicts increased robot use between 1993 and 2007.
When we use our index to capture diﬀerences in the increased use of robots, we again ﬁnd that robots increased
productivity, and we detect no signiﬁcant eﬀect on hours worked. As an important check on the validity of this
exercise, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between replaceability and productivity growth in the period before the
adoption of robots.
We conservatively calculate that on average, the increased use of robots contributed about 0.37 percentage points
to annual GDP growth, which accounts for more than one tenth of total GDP growth over this period. The
contribution to labour productivity growth was about 0.36 percentage points, accounting for one sixth of productivity
growth.
This makes robots’ contribution to the aggregate economy roughly on a par with previous important technologies,
such as the railroads in the nineteenth century and the US highways in the twentieth century. The eﬀects are also
comparable to the recent contributions of information and communication technologies. But it is worth noting that
robots make up just over 2 per cent of capital, which is less than previous technological drivers of growth.
Our ﬁndings on the aggregate impact of robots are signiﬁcant given recent concerns in macroeconomic research
that the productivity gains from technology in general may have slowed down. Robert Gordon expresses a
particularly pessimistic view, and there are broader worries about ‘secular stagnation’, although others remain more
optimistic.
We expect that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of robots will extend into the future as new robot capabilities are developed,
and service robots come of age. But our ﬁndings do come with a note of caution: there is some evidence of
diminishing marginal returns to robot use – ‘congestion eﬀects’ – so they are not a panacea for growth.
Although we do not ﬁnd evidence of a negative impact of robots on aggregate employment, we see a more nuanced
picture when we break down employment (and the wage bill) by skill groups. Robots appear to reduce the hours and
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the wage bill shares of low-skilled workers and, to a lesser extent, those of middle-skilled workers.
At the same time, robots have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the employment of high-skilled workers. This pattern diﬀers
from the eﬀects that recent research ﬁnds for information and communication technologies, which seem to beneﬁt
high-skilled workers at the expense of middle-skilled workers.
In summary, we ﬁnd that industrial robots make signiﬁcant contributions to labour productivity and aggregate growth,
and their use also increases wages and total factor productivity. While fears that robots destroy jobs at a large scale
have not materialised, we ﬁnd some evidence that robots reduce the employment of low and middle-skilled workers.
This article was published in Centrepiece, the magazine of the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance (CEP), and
summarises ‘Robots at Work’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1335.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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of the London School of Economics.
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